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Knowledge  incentive  mechanisms  are  a new  development  in  the  management  of knowledge.  The  most
prevalent  perspective  presented  in the  available  literature  is that  the  knowledge  incentive  mechanisms
must  have  the  ability  to  manage  the  ﬂow  of  business  knowledge.  This  study  explores  the  relationship
among  knowledge  incentive  mechanisms,  knowledge  psychological  ownership,  and  individual  knowl-
edge  creation  behavior.  This  study  uses  structural  equation  modeling  to  test  a  sample  of  R&D  professionalsndividual knowledge creation behaviors
from  high-tech  companies  in  Taiwan.  Data  analysis  suggests  that  knowledge  incentive  mechanisms
promote  the  psychological  ownership  by  the  knowledge  owner  so  that  he  or she  actively  carries  out
knowledge  innovation.  This  implies  that  knowledge  incentive  mechanisms  stress  private  proprietary
characteristics  employees  who  possess  real  ownership  when  they  innovate  will  deem  such innovation
as  an  extension  of  self,  giving  rise  to  a  protective  or  defensive  mindset,  which  then  has  an  impact  on
individual  knowledge  creation  behaviors  because  of  the  psychological  ownership  of  knowledge.. Introduction
Knowledge-based view (KBV) researchers increasingly have
aid attention to incentives in realizing the innovation-related
ctivities,  where effort and learning have a high degree of com-
lementarity (Bridoux, Coeurderoy, & Durand, 2011; Coff, 2003;
nsead & Lim, 2007; Ziedonis, 2004). Their main argument is
hat knowledge-based (value creation perspective) and incentives-
ased (value appropriation perspective) perspectives complement
ach other to explain individual knowledge creation behaviors. In
ostering knowledge creation behaviors among employees, man-
gers usually face a public good dilemma: the maximization of
ndividual employees’ material payoffs conﬂicts with the achieve-
ent of the collective goal of creating knowledge for the ﬁrm (Fehr
 Fischbacher, 2002; Ostrom, 2000). In recent work, scholars have
iscussed the diversity of incentives driving individual knowledge
reation behaviors (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Nickerson & Zenger,
008), but these studies have not explored the mechanisms to inte-
rate both perspectives.
Knowledge incentive mechanisms are the newest trend in cor-
orate knowledge management (KM), and recent research has
ome up with a number of different deﬁnitions of such knowl-
dge incentive mechanisms (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Foss, 2006;
randori, 2001; Hsu, 2006; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Osterloh
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& Frey, 2000). Child and McGrath (2001) proposed that organi-
zations based on manpower capital are different from traditional
enterprises in that they rely less on power hierarchies and high-
powered performance incentives, and instead focus on culture and
clan controls. But Teece (2003) put forward the opposite view
that minimum supervision and high-powered performance incen-
tives are in fact effective tools for enhancing innovative behavior
within an organization. No matter what kind of knowledge incen-
tive mechanism they put at the heart of their research, past papers
mostly agree that any such mechanism should have the capac-
ity to promote the circulation of knowledge within a business or
organization. The problem at this point is the lack of a good the-
ory, and of a way  of systematically testing knowledge incentive
mechanisms. This research attempts to explore knowledge incen-
tive mechanism from the perspective of property rights (as a form
of ownership), which represents an entirely new approach to KM
aimed at stimulating organizational innovation.
Another angle from which to deal with knowledge and its man-
agement is the stock view, which sees knowledge as a property.
Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (1991) thinks that ownership has a
signiﬁcant psychological effect on employees’ behavior and inno-
vative attitude. The term psychological ownership is used in this
context to describe a feeling among an organization’s employees
that a particular target or object (knowledge) belongs to me  or
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.us (Pierce et al., 1991), and the theory is that for any knowledge
incentive mechanism to effectively promote innovative behavior,
it needs to utilize these feelings of psychological ownership. An
important question asked in this approach is: how can knowledge
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parties involved to invest in ﬁelds that are seminal for the devel-
opment of society as a whole.
1 This study focus on a property rights view of asset ownership.
2 Research on governance mechanisms focuses largely on two topics. One  is the
question of how to best balance the interests of shareholders and management.M.-S. Liu / International Journal of Inf
ncentive mechanisms help to stimulate and motivate owners of
nowledge, and reduce the emotional distance to knowledge and
deas, so that knowledge can be allocated and applied in the most
ffective manner?
In order to integrate and extend these existing views, this study
evelops a theoretical frame and undertakes an empirical study to
xplore the knowledge creation behaviors of R&D professionals in
aiwanese high-tech industries. The structure of this study is pre-
ented as following. In Section 2, this study reviews the related
iterature on knowledge incentive mechanisms from a property
ights perspective, knowledge psychological ownership, and indi-
idual knowledge creation behavior, and present an integrated
odel followed by the hypothesized relationships of these vari-
bles. Section 3 describes the research methodology, while Section
 reports the ﬁndings. The last section includes a discussion of the
ndings.
. Literature review
.1. Individual knowledge creation behavior
According to the value creation perspective, knowledge creation
s crucial in maintaining a business’s new value creation, a point
hat has been veriﬁed by a number of scholars and studies (Felin
 Hesterly, 2007; Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). Yet are there not
ther factors that affect the subtle interplay of knowledge creation
nd competitiveness? Knowledge creation originates with indi-
iduals, and gradually accumulates in the minds of the members
f an organization (tacit knowledge). Through systematic articu-
ation, individuals make this personal knowledge available to the
ntire organization, thus turning tacit into explicit knowledge. The
rganization then collects and combines these scattered pieces of
nowledge into an integrated whole, which serves as a pool of
xplicit information to all the organization’s members, allowing
hem to increase and expand the boundaries of their tacit knowl-
dge.
Lam (2000) asserts that individual knowledge creation is a part
f an organization’s knowledge creation pool, and that it comprises
ll the knowledge, information, and skills an individual possesses.
uch knowledge creation can be employed for particular tasks,
r the solving of speciﬁc problems, but since there are cognitive
imitations on an individual’s capacity for storing and processing
nformation, individual knowledge creation often tends to be of
 tacit nature. Meanwhile, Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) also
tresses the important role played by individuals in innovative
rocesses. Other scholars who place a ﬁrm focus on individual-
evel knowledge creation within organizations include Brown and
oodland (1999),  Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) and Nonaka
1994).
The creation of knowledge or ideas stands at the beginning
f every individual creation behavior. Individual knowledge cre-
tion behavior involves continuous interaction with the external
orld (Nonaka, 1994). The know-how and information that indi-
iduals gain over time forms their knowledge stocks. Current
nowledge stocks shape the scope and direction of the search
or new knowledge, so knowledge creation is a path-dependent
rocess. The term “individual knowledge creation behavior” here
escribes the behaviors by which an individual acquires new
nowledge (i.e. knowledge previously not in the individual’s pos-
ession). Possible sources for an individual’s acquisition of new
nowledge include: (1) individual research, experimentation, and
earning/experience (e.g. learning by doing); (2) survey and inves-
igation of external resources; (3) other systematic processes
or the acquirement of new knowledge (MCFadyen & Cannella,
004).ion Management 32 (2012) 442– 450 443
2.2. Knowledge incentive mechanisms
Approaching knowledge incentive mechanisms from the
ownership angle,1 this study ﬁnd that knowledge incentive mech-
anisms involve the allocation of property rights (Jones, 1983),
which basically means the allocation of incentives (Barzel, 1997).
As this study have stated, knowledge incentive mechanisms are
deﬁned as mechanisms that a principal interposes between the
principal and an agent/agents, allowing the principal to pro-
vide the agent(s) with incentives, and to supervise/control the
agent’s or agents’ activities. Knowledge incentive mechanisms
are knowledge governance mechanisms from a property rights
perspective.2 Motivation mechanisms in this context include
searching for knowledge/information and knowledge sharing, as
well as accumulation and enhancement of human capital (Foss &
Mahnke, 2003). Property rights function as a powerful incentive
for individual knowledge creation (Brown, Fakhfakh, & Sessions,
1999a, 1999b)—an insight that dovetails well with Vroom’s (1964)
expectancy theory of motivation, which states that stock sharing
and proﬁt sharing not only provide strong ﬁnancial incentives on
the individual level, but also help to improve a corporation’s over-
all performance. Brown et al. (1999a, 1999b) also observes that
property rights sharing arrangements have a positive effect on a
corporation’s performance. Property rights sharing arrangements
are used widely in businesses. Generally, property rights sharing
arrangements in knowledge management context include prop-
erty rights sharing arrangement of R&D and property rights sharing
arrangement (Brandes, Dharwadkai, & Lemesis, 2003; Grandori,
2001). Let us now have a look at various knowledge incentive mech-
anisms with regard to property rights:
2.2.1. Property rights sharing arrangement of R&D  (PRSA of R&D)
Property rights sharing arrangement of R&D (PRSA of R&D) in
this context means that individual employees who participate in
joint venture projects and R&D work are given the opportunity to
reap part of the economic yield resulting from a given R&D project,
mostly through a share in intellectual property rights. The sharing
of intellectual property right thus becomes a crucial part of any col-
laborative project. Generally, the parties involved in such a project
will determine the ratio of intellectual property right allocation in
accordance with the relevant technology licensing contracts. With
the help of mathematical formulae and expressions, researchers
have arrived at the following theoretical conclusions about how
R&D units or ﬁrms allocate property rights within incomplete con-
tractual frameworks (Grandori, 2001): (1) when buyer or seller
acquire the property rights to the entire results of an R&D project, or
where all the property rights belong to one party, it becomes impos-
sible to compensate for previous under-investment or eliminate
opportunism; (2) the optimal allocation of R&D property rights is
achieved when the party with the largest inﬂuence on the project’s
surplus is granted the biggest share of that surplus; (3) the estab-
lishment of R&D joint ventures serves as a way of encouraging theImportant governance mechanisms in this context include the board of direc-
tors, stock-based compensation, ﬁnancial statements, and takeover constraints.
The  other approach examines intra-company mechanisms aimed at optimizing the
interests of and cooperation between different levels of management, including
strategic control mechanisms (such as balanced scorecard models) and incentive
mechanisms (such as proﬁt sharing or R&D property rights sharing arrangements).
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.2.2. Property rights sharing arrangement (PRSA)
Property rights sharing arrangement (PRSA) is a mechanism
nder which individual employees are awarded an extra income
ased on the margin of the company’s (or one of its department’s)
roﬁts. In other words, it is a system under which staff participates
n the enterprise’s economic fortune via optional contracts and at a
xed ratio (Sherman, Bohlander, & Chruden, 1988). PRSA can thus
e described as an added value or bonus that serves to motivate
mployees to actively contribute to the corporation’s overall per-
ormance.
.3. Knowledge incentive mechanisms and individual knowledge
reation behavior
The more diverse existing knowledge is, the better new knowl-
dge can be absorbed. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) explain how
ew knowledge enters a corporation via individuals, and how such
ew knowledge needs to be related to existing knowledge in some
ay. Individual members of an organization possessing a whole
ange of knowledge in different ﬁelds will be better equipped to
ecognize the importance of new knowledge and its relationship
o existing information. They will also be able to link up the two
ypes of knowledge, combining them in useful ways. Knowledge
ncentive mechanisms can manage knowledge resources through
arket competition, price, and contracts. An example for this
s PRSA of R&D. Other ways for knowledge incentive mecha-
isms to manage knowledge resources include proﬁt and stock
haring schemes. The value of property rights is directly con-
ected to employer–employee relationships (Shperling, Rousseau,
 Ferrante, 2003): increased participation in company affairs and
tock ownership allows employees to assume a more active role,
nd encourages them to create new knowledge and thus new assets
or the corporation.
Another aspect of this is that knowledge incentive mechanisms
unction as allocators of property rights (Barzel, 1997). This hap-
ens as a way of allocating motivation, including motivation for
he creation of new knowledge (Foss & Mahnke, 2003). Particularly
ithin knowledge incentive mechanisms, high-powered perfor-
ance incentives may  adequately strengthen individual innovate
ehavior within an organization (Teece, 2003). High return knowl-
dge creation is almost always individual knowledge creation,
ecause the prospect of proﬁts produces the strongest results on
he individual level. Put differently, the level of income among a
orporation’s employees will certainly have a palpable inﬂuence
n these employees’ motivation to actively engage in innovative
ehavior. From all the above, this study can formulate the inﬂu-
nce of knowledge incentive mechanisms on individual creation
ehavior.
.4. Knowledge psychological ownership
Pierce et al. (1991) believes that there are two levels on which
wnership affects employees’ behavior. The ﬁrst level is ownership,
ut the second level involves psychological ownership. Ownership
s created through practical arrangements within the corporate
ystem, but psychological ownership has to be carefully fostered
hrough multifaceted socio-psychological effects and factors that
an inﬂuence employee behavior (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). In
ther words, genuine ownership is the result of psychological
wnership, and employees need to feel secure of the latter if the
ompany wants to steer their behavior and performance in a posi-
ive direction. At the same time, physical ownership has a positive
ffect on psychological ownership.
Psychological ownership of knowledge is deﬁned as a mindset
n which employees perceive that a certain knowledge or infor-
ation belongs to them. Within an organization, it is vital thation Management 32 (2012) 442– 450
employees develop this kind of perception or awareness, and feel
closely connected with the knowledge they own (Dittmar, 1992),
because only through this kind of psychological link can knowl-
edge become a part of the individual’s identity (Pierce et al., 1991).
As this study have stated, people are motivated to strive for the
possession of knowledge because it gives them control, and as an
individual acquires ownership and thus control, he or she expe-
riences efﬁcacy and effectance. These basic experiences are then
utilized to inﬂuence individual perception and identiﬁcation, a
process that prompts individuals to set in motion, control, and
maintain the kinds of behavior expected from them by the orga-
nization (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). Let us have a closer look at
this psychological process: before people begin to engage in inno-
vative behavior, they tend to carefully consider and evaluate their
situation, and try to estimate whether or not they are currently
in possession and control of knowledge. Individual expectance of
efﬁcacy will determine whether or not, and to what extent, the
individual will engage in, and maintain, the kind of behavior that
the organization expects from it. If the individual feels that it does
indeed own relevant knowledge, and considers itself capable of
high efﬁcacy and efﬁciency, it will then devote its entire efforts to
completing the tasks or duties that the organization has given to it.
On the other hand, if the individual perceives that it does not pos-
sess any relevant knowledge, and deems its own  efﬁcacy/efﬁciency
to be low, it is quite likely that it will abandon its efforts prema-
turely, and thus cause a task or mission to fail.
2.5. Knowledge incentive mechanisms and knowledge
psychological ownership
Knowledge incentive mechanisms endow employees with
shared physical ownership in speciﬁc objects and/or their ﬁnancial
value, allowing them to enjoy the beneﬁts of control over speciﬁc
property (Pierce et al., 1991). Organizations employ knowledge
incentive mechanisms (PRSA of R&D and PRSA) to inﬂuence the
function and role of employees, granting employees’ participation
in ownership and letting them develop a sense of psychological
ownership of knowledge. The latter is crucial in enabling employ-
ees to cultivate a sense of physical ownership, which in turn will
make them much more likely to behave and perform in the way the
organization desires. In addition, the more property rights indi-
viduals are given, the more likely they are to develop a sense of
psychological ownership of knowledge (Pierce et al., 1991). When
employees are provided with physical ownership (e.g. in the form of
company shares), they will experience feelings of success and other
positive emotions, which will further contribute to their sense of
psychological ownership of knowledge. Reviewing the literature
on psychological ownership, Furby (1978) ﬁnds that when people
develop a sense of ownership towards a certain target, they will
begin to view that target as an extension of their own person. This
will lead to the generation of a self-concept, an image projected
towards the environment (Weick, 1995). As Hall (1996) points out,
awareness of psychological ownership makes people want to pro-
tect or defend their property rights. This research discovered that
the higher the employees’ sense of psychological ownership of
knowledge, the more likely the employees are to view this knowl-
edge as their exclusive property, and this will in turn lead to more
egoistic forms of protective or defensive behavior. From these ﬁnd-
ings about perceived exclusive ownership of knowledge, this study
can deduce the next two  hypotheses:Hypothesis 1. The more aware individuals are of PRSA of R&D
(knowledge incentive mechanisms) within their organization, the
higher their sense of psychological ownership of knowledge will
be.
ormat
H
e
h
w
2
k
o
e
V
W
k
h
c
e
r
t
k
a
(
i
c
p
k
y
b
a
i
1
b
n
p
d
i
m
W
o
e
c
a
F
H
l
iM.-S. Liu / International Journal of Inf
ypothesis 2. The more aware individuals are of PRSA (knowl-
dge incentive mechanisms) within their organization, the
igher their sense of psychological ownership of knowledge
ill be.
.6. Knowledge psychological ownership and individual
nowledge creation behavior
This research conﬁrms that sense of knowledge psychological
wnership is an important factor for predicting the behavior of
mployees (Pierce et al., 1991, 2003; Pierce, Kostova, & Dir, 2003;
an Dyne & Pierce, 2004; VandeWalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995).
hen employees do have a sense of psychological ownership of
nowledge, this may  lead to three possible outcomes: (1) it will
ave a positive effect on their innovative behavior/willingness to
reate new knowledge; (2) the employees will view their knowl-
dge as extension of themselves; (3) they will develop a sense of
esponsibility towards the corporation, perceiving it as their duty
o create new knowledge.
Employees that have a sense of psychological ownership of
nowledge feel that they possess this knowledge (Dittmar, 1992),
nd develop a close psychological link towards this knowledge
Pierce et al., 1991). In other words, the knowledge becomes an
ntegral part of their individual identity. When individuals per-
eive in this way that knowledge is theirs, they deﬁne their own
osition within the organization in terms of their control over
nowledge. This means they use ownership of knowledge as a
ardstick of their own value, and judge their own performance
y the knowledge they have. Individuals tend to gain a sense of
chievement from their control of knowledge, which becomes an
mportant factor of their internal self-evaluation process (Huber,
991). For the purposes of this research, an employee’s innovative
ehavior is deﬁned as individual acquisition and/or generation of
ew knowledge (i.e. knowledge not previously in the individual’s
ossession). If during or as a result of this process an individual
evelops a relatively keen sense of ownership of knowledge, the
ndividual is then more likely to engage in innovative behavior
ore or less exclusively aimed at maximizing its own interests.
hen this happens in a corporate scenario, employees tend to focus
n behavior that helps them to create and accumulate new knowl-
dge, but are reluctant to engage in sharing behavior would run
ounter to their own perceived best interests. Therefore, this study
rrives at the third hypothesis. The hypothesized model is shown in
ig. 1.
ypothesis 3. The higher a knowledge user’s sense of psycho-
ogical ownership of knowledge, the more likely he is to engage in
ndividual knowledge creation behavior.
PRS A of R&D
PRSA 
Kno wledge 
psychologic
ownershi p
H2 
H1 
Fig. 1. Hypothesiion Management 32 (2012) 442– 450 445
3. Methodology
3.1. Sampling and respondents
Taiwanese high-tech industry offers an excellent context within
which knowledge incentive mechanisms promote employees’
knowledge creation behavior. In the early 1980s, Taiwanese high-
tech industry started to develop in the form of original equipment
manufacturers. Afterward, to enhance its competitiveness and
proﬁtability, Taiwanese high-tech industry gradually upgraded
itself by engaging in product design and production management
(Tsai & Hung, 2006). Now, Taiwanese high-tech businesses are
capable of undertaking product design, development and man-
ufacturing but are not directly engaged in marketing and brand
promotion. The reason why Taiwanese high-tech businesses can
be studied are the followings: ﬁrst, Taiwan has high quality R&D
talents as well as the advantage of relatively low cost of R&D. Sec-
ond, the R&D outsourcing of US companies, coupled with the US
companies” focusing their efforts on marketing and brands, also
offers Taiwanese high-tech industries an opportunity to transform
and promote themselves (Liu & Liu, 2011; Tsai & Hung, 2006).
In addition, R&D professionals are widely acknowledged as
knowledge workers. Their works are characterized by complex sys-
tem design, knowledge related to the rapid update of technology,
and strong competition for sustaining innovation (Assimakopoulos
& Yan, 2006). In addition, the knowledge creation behaviors among
R&D professionals are quite different from those of traditional
workers (Berends, Bij, Debackere, & Weggeman, 2006; Cabrera &
Cabrera, 2002; Liu & Liu, 2008). Since the R&D process is extremely
complicated and an employee only possesses expertise in a spe-
ciﬁc area, knowledge will not be exposed to other individuals until
knowledge owners make the objects available. Therefore, it is valu-
able to investigate how R&D professionals create knowledge among
members. Since knowledge creation behaviors are so critical for
R&D professionals, the current sample consists of R&D employees
employed in high-tech companies in Taiwan. The companies stud-
ied are engaged in applied research within the computer systems
and other industries, which are pivotal for high-tech industries.
The research subjects for this study were expatriates from Tai-
wanese enterprises operating abroad. Concerning the difﬁculties
of choosing appropriate samples for our study, this study used
convenient sampling to collect data. In Asian countries, personal
relationships are very helpful in collecting research data. Our team
members used their personal relationships to contact potential
samples and sent questionnaires to R&D employees who had indi-
cated their willingness to participate in this survey. Data collection
was  conducted during the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. The survey was
processed through multi-channels, including visits in person, reg-
ular mail, e-mail, and web  sites. A preliminary test showed that
the sources of data collection make no signiﬁcant difference in
Individual 
kno wledge creati on 
behavio rs
al 
H3 
zed model.
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Table 1
Respondent demographic information.
Variable Frequency Percentage (%)
Gender
Male 251 60.9
Female 161 39.1
Age
Under 30 169 41.0
30–39 196 47.6
40–49 41 10.0
Over 50 6 1.4
Education
Bachelor’s degree 360 87.5
Graduate degree 92 22.3
Ph.D. degree 1 0.2
Tenure in present jobs
Under 5 243 59.0
6–9.9 125 30.3
10–14.9 29 7.1
15–19.9 10 2.4
Over 20 5 1.2
Manager
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Table 2
Correlations, average variance extracted (AVE) and the square root of average vari-
ance extracted among the factors of the measurement model.
Variable AVE 1 2 3 4
1. PRSA of R&D 0.68 0.82
2.  PRSA 0.84 0.72 0.92
3. Knowledge
psychological ownership
0.84 0.37 0.35 0.92
4. Individual knowledge
creation behaviors
0.71 0.25 0.38 0.18 0.84Yes 60 14.6
No  352 85.4
esults. In all, 460 questionnaires were completed. Of these, 48 were
ejected on the basis of missing data, leaving a useable sample size
f 412 for analysis. The respondent demographic information is
hown in Table 1.
.2. Measures
.2.1. Independent variables
This study used eight items based on the theoretical literature
o assess possible knowledge incentive mechanisms in high-tech
ndustries. The items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale. The
ight items used to assess knowledge incentive mechanisms were
ased on the discussion of knowledge governance mechanisms by
randori (2001),3 Bai, Tao, & Wu (2004)Bai, Tao, and Wu  (2004) and
rown et al. (1999a, 1999b), including discussions of property rights
haring arrangement of R&D and property rights sharing arrangement.
roperty rights sharing arrangement included stock sharing, proﬁt
haring and other incentives (Bai et al., 2004; Brown et al., 1999a,
999b).
.2.2. Mediator variables
This study used seven items based on the theoretical literature
o assess the possible knowledge psychological ownership among
&D professionals. The items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale
egarding knowledge psychological ownership among R&D profes-
ionals. The seven items used to assess knowledge psychological
wnership were based on the discussion of psychological owner-
hip toward the organization by Van Dyne and Pierce (2004),  but
his study reworded it to test participants’ feelings of possession
owards their knowledge (e.g. “This is MY  knowledge”4)(Mayhew,
3 Grandori (2001) analyzed a variety of governance mechanisms for the creation,
haring, and integration of knowledge, and employed ground theory to survey gov-
rnance mechanisms commonly used by business enterprises. She quoted 3M as
n  example for the creation of shared property rights within the corporation (e.g.
roperty rights sharing arrangement). The measurements of property rights shar-
ng  arrangement are still not developed. Thus, this study adopted the concept of
roperty rights sharing arrangement (Grandori, 2001) to develop the questionnaires.
4 The difference between “This is MY knowledge” and “I sense that is MY knowl-
dge” is the concept of role orientation. “This is MY  knowledge” mean that my
nowledge is particular task knowledge that may  change daily; “I sense that is
Y  knowledge” mean that my  knowledge is to help carry out the responsibilities
ssigned to the team, to participate in team decisions, to cross-train, and to use myN = 412.
AVE is average variance extracted.
The diagonal of the matrix presents the square root of average variance extracted.
Ashkanasy, Bramble, & Gardner, 2007; Pierce, O’Driscoll, & Coghlan,
2004). These items involved a reverse-worded item.
3.2.3. Dependent variables
Individual knowledge creation behaviors were the major
dependent variables of interest in this study. Knowledge creation
among R&D professionals, which was deﬁned as the process by
which an individual acquires new knowledge, was  rated by a 6-
point Likert scale and measured by three questions. The individual
knowledge creation behaviors include “individual research, exper-
imentation, and learning experience”, “survey and investigation
of external resources” and “other systematic processes for the
acquirement of new knowledge”. The measures of this variable
were adapted from the theoretical literature (Liu, 2008).
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) was  used to examine the
validity and reliability of the research instrument. Validity was
addressed in two ways. First, operationalization of the constructs
drew upon an extensive literature review, and questionnaires were
discussed with superiors in actual organizations. Both processes
were intended to enhance content validity. Second, the results
of the CFA illustrated that four variables displayed convergent
validity, since the analysis yielded four factors with factor loading
displaying the expected patterns. Table 2 shows the correlations
among the four factors of the CFA model. The internal-consistency
coefﬁcients of the reliability of the unity are weighted sums of the
item scores, and the ˛-coefﬁcients vary between 0.86 and 0.94.
The Cronbach’s  ˛ coefﬁcients of the four variables of this study
all exceeded the 0.70 threshold, with the reliability and internal
consistency of the variables conﬁrmed.
3.2.4. Construct validity
In general, construct validity refers to the degree to which
instrument truly measure the constructs for what it is intended
to measure. There are several types of construct validity measures
that include the convergent and discriminating validity. Conver-
gent validity is measured by average variance extracted (AVE) for
each construct during the reliability analysis that should be 0.5%
or 50% or better (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 2 shows the aver-
age variance extracted (AVE) for the constructs ranged from 0.68
to 0.84 indicating a sufﬁcient level of convergent validity of all
constructs. To further verify discriminating validity, Fornell and
Larcker (1981) advocate that correlations between items in any
two  constructs should be lower than the square root of the average
variance extracted shared by items within a construct. As shown in
Table 2, the square root of the average variance extracted shared
between a construct and its items was  greater than the correla-
tions between the construct and any other construct in the model,
satisfying Fornell and Larker’s (1981) criteria for discriminating
judgment to contribute to the team’s productivity, maintenance, and development
(Parker & Wall, 1997).
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Table 3
Means, standard deviations, and factor loadings for the items.
Item Item no. Mean SD Standard factor loading
PRSA of R&D
Rate of the stock sharing of R&D PR1 3.13 1.46 0.69
Rate  of the proﬁt sharing of R&D PR2 2.59 1.46 0.86
Incentives for R&D project PR3 2.73 1.53 0.90
PRSA
Rate  of the stock sharing PS1 3.00 1.56 0.83
Rate  of the proﬁt sharing PS2 2.69 1.53 0.97
Rate  of variable pay PS3 2.78 1.56 0.95
Knowledge psychological ownership
This is MY  knowledge KP1 3.50 1.37 0.86
I  feel a very high degree of personal ownership for knowledge KP2 3.50 1.35 0.98
I  sense that this is MY  knowledge KP3 3.53 1.34 0.91
Individual knowledge creation behaviors
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estimated relations.
The path model had a test statistic of 2 = 151.28, df = 50
(2/df = 35) (p = 0.00). Other indices of ﬁt also showed the ﬁt toIndividual research, experimentation, and learning experience 
Survey  and investigation of external resources
Other  systematic processes for the acquirement of new knowledge
alidity. The above results, therefore, conﬁrm that our instrument
ncompassed satisfactory construct validity.
.2.5. Common method variance
The data for the independent, mediator variables and depend-
nt variables were obtained from the same respondents, which may
ave introduced a common method bias. This study controlled for
his bias both methodologically and statistically. First, this study
ook steps to protect respondents’ anonymity and counterbal-
nced the order of items. Second, this study employed Harman’s
ingle-factor test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
peciﬁcally, this study incorporated all the variables in an
xploratory factor analysis and examined the unrotated factor solu-
ion to determine the number of factors necessary to account for
he variance. The results revealed no general factor (the loading for
he ﬁrst principle component was only 0.35), suggesting that there
s no systematic variance common to the measures.
. Results
.1. The measurement model
This study tested the factor structure of our survey measure
sing conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA). The CFA model was devel-
ped with the purposes of testing whether the hypothesized latent
ariables could be identiﬁed empirically, and for examining the
alidity and reliability of the measures. First, according to the suc-
essive testing and modiﬁcation of different models on the same
ata of course, different variable sets were combined into the
nal model. The ﬁnal CFA model had a 2 value of 96.36, df = 48
2/df = 2) (p = 0.00). Other indices of ﬁt also showed acceptable ﬁt
GFI = 0.96, CFI = 0.99, NFI = 0.98, NNFI = 0.98). Standardized factor
oadings, along with descriptive item data, are shown in Table 3.
Eight items measured the knowledge incentive mechanisms.
fter a principal component analysis, this study removed items
R4 and PR5, loading by less than 0.5. Together, the two  factors
ere able to explain over 79.57% of the total variation in the six
tems. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001). The
aiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic was 0.73, suggesting that individual
easures of sampling adequacy were generally high. Three items
easured the PRSA of R&D. Three items with loadings from 0.69 to
.930 asked about “the rate of the stock sharing of R&D”, “the rate
f the proﬁt sharing of R&D” and “the incentives for R&D project”.
ronbach’s  ˛ for the full 3-item scale is 0.86. The PRSA factor was
elated to three items. The highest loading (0.97) was  observed for
he item that asked about “the rate of the proﬁt sharing”. Another
oading (0.95) was observed for the item that asked about “the rate4.28 1.00 0.70
4.31 1.05 0.87
4.19 1.10 0.94
of variable pay”. The lower loading (0.83) asked about “the rate of
the stock sharing”. Cronbach’s  ˛ for the full 3-item scale is 0.94.
Seven items measured the knowledge psychological ownership.
After a principal component analysis, this study removed items KP
4, KP 5 and KP6, loading by less than 0.5. The item KP7 (reverse-
worded item) was  dropped. Together, the factor was able to explain
over 81.71% of the total variation in the three items. Bartlett’s test
of sphericity was  signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001). The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin
statistic was 0.76, suggesting that individual measures of sampling
adequacy were generally high. Three items measured the knowl-
edge psychological ownership factor, and all items had substantial
loadings (0.86–0.98) on the factor. The highest loading (0.98) was
observed for the item that asked about “I feel a very high degree of
personal ownership for knowledge”. Another loading (0.91) was
observed for the item that asked about “I sense that this is MY
knowledge”. The lower loading (0.86) asked about “this is MY
knowledge”. Cronbach’s ˛ for the full 3-item scale is 0.94.
Three items measured the individual knowledge creation behav-
iors factor. After a principal component analysis, the factor was
able to explain over 79.82% of the total variation in the three
items. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001). The
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic was 0.72, suggesting that individual
measures of sampling adequacy were generally high. Three items
measured the individual knowledge creation behaviors factor, and
all items had substantial loadings (0.70–0.94) on the factor. The
highest loading (0.94) was observed for the item that asked about
“other systematic processes for the acquirement of new knowl-
edge”. Another loading (0.87) was  observed for the item that asked
about “survey and investigation of external resources”. The lower
loading (0.70) asked about “individual research, experimentation,
and learning experience”. Cronbach’s ˛ for the full 3-item scale is
0.87.
4.2. The structural model
In the next step of modeling, path models were ﬁtted to test the
proposed model. The hypotheses do not explicitly specify the rela-
tions among all the factors, and some unexpected relations were
found, so a sequence of models was ﬁtted. The selection criteria for
the ﬁnal model were: (1) ﬁt to data and (2) interpretability of the5 The relative Chi-Square (2/df) is the traditional measure for evaluating overall
model ﬁt. A ratio between 2 and 3 is indicative of a “good” or “acceptable” data-model
ﬁt, respectively. Thus, this study ﬁnds an acceptable ﬁt.
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cig. 2. Path model for relations among the latent variables. Note: Path coefﬁcients ar
epresent latent variables. Unidirectional arrows express direct effects. T-values ab
e acceptable (GFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96, NNFI = 0.97), so this
tudy cannot reject the hypothesis that the path model correctly
eproduced the correlations among the latent variables. Fig. 2
hows the model.
The pattern of direct effects revealed by the path model seems
o provide somewhat mixed evidence for the study’s hypothe-
es. According to Hypothesis 1, this study expected a positive
elationship between PRSA of R&D and knowledge psychologi-
al ownership. However, the path model reveals no signiﬁcant
orrelations between PRSA of R&D and knowledge psychologi-
al ownership (−0.04). This factor likewise failed to demonstrate
igniﬁcant correlations in the model. The reason could be Tai-
anese high-tech industry gradually upgraded itself from original
quipment manufacturers (OEM) to original product design man-
facturers (ODM) (Tsai & Hung, 2006). After the mid-1990s,
aiwanese manufacturers took a step further to stress creativity
nd design capacity. Because shifting upward from OEM to ODM
as in a short period of time, R&D professionals could not dis-
inguish PRSA of R&D from PRSA. Thus, the path model reveals
o signiﬁcant correlations between PRSA of R&D and knowledge
sychological ownership.
According to Hypothesis 2, this study expected a positive effect
rom PRSA on knowledge psychological ownership. The result of
he path model supported this hypothesis: there was a positive
irect effect of PRSA on knowledge psychological ownership (0.42).
ypothesis 3 proposed that there should be a positive effect from
he knowledge psychological ownership on individual knowledge
reation behaviors. The path model showed a positive effect of
he knowledge psychological ownership on individual knowledge
reation behaviors (0.19). One of knowledge incentive mecha-
isms, PRSA, inﬂuences individual knowledge creation behaviors
ia knowledge psychological ownership. Thus, the results of the
ath model support hypotheses of this research.
. Discussion
A contribution of this study is our research on interventions –
he knowledge creative link was our conclusion from the integrated
odel, in which knowledge incentive mechanisms including PRSA
as found to have a positive effect on knowledge psychological
wnership, and to thereby inﬂuence individual knowledge creation
ehaviors among R&D professionals.
Our integrated model of knowledge creative behavior leads
s to expect that the “knowledge psychological ownership” will
ediate the relationship between knowledge incentive mecha-
isms and individual knowledge creation behaviors among R&D
rofessionals. Path analysis suggests that the knowledge psycho-
ogical ownership may  mediate “PRSA” and “individual knowledge
reation behaviors”. This study found that the mediation modelsdardized partial regression coefﬁcients estimated by maximum likelihood. Ellipses
96 (p < 0.05) are shown in bold. N = 412.
existed in our integrated knowledge creative model. “Knowl-
edge psychological ownership” mediated the relationship between
“PRSA” and “individual knowledge creation behaviors”. This
implies that the factor of “knowledge psychological ownership”
plays a very important role in the integrated knowledge creative
model. It may  be that the characteristics of the knowledge used by
R&D professionals in high-tech industries – complex system design
knowledge, rapid technology upgrades, and constant innovation –
are necessary to maintain competitiveness (Assimakopoulos & Yan,
2006). As discussed earlier, if R&D professionals feel that they do
indeed own relevant knowledge, and considers themselves capa-
ble of high efﬁcacy and efﬁciency, they will then devote their entire
efforts to completing the tasks or duties that the organization has
given to them.
Therefore, ﬁndings from evidential analyses include: (1) A new
assessment of knowledge incentive mechanisms was helpful in
gaining a more detailed understanding of individual knowledge
creation behavior. (2) The psychological ownership of knowl-
edge can encourage individual knowledge creation behavior. (3)
Knowledge incentive mechanisms stress private and individual
proprietary characteristics employees who possess real owner-
ship (i.e. corporate stock) when they innovate will deem such
innovation as an extension of self, giving rise to a protective or
defensive mindset, which then has an impact on individual knowl-
edge creation behaviors because of the psychological ownership of
knowledge.
6. Implications
6.1. Theoretical implications
This research’s contribution to KM and related ﬁelds consists
of establishing a comprehensive multi-construct analytical frame-
work for the examination of individual KM.  This research applies
the theory of governance mechanisms (which is a part of organiza-
tional theory) and the theory of psychological ownership (which is
an important concept in the ﬁeld of organizational behavior) to the
study of individual innovative behavior (i.e. creation of new knowl-
edge). The goal is to explain how organizations use knowledge
incentive mechanisms to inﬂuence individual knowledge creation
behavior through the effects of (the sense of) psychological owner-
ship of knowledge. In the following this study brieﬂy discussed the
concrete contributions this research makes to the existing theories
in various relevant ﬁelds.6.1.1. Examining knowledge incentive mechanisms from the
perspective of ownership
This research breaks with the traditional approach of explor-
ing the meaning and function of knowledge incentive mechanisms
ormat
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y looking at hierarchy-based, price/contract-based, and identity-
ased forms of governance, and attempts instead to explore the
elevant issues from the angle of ownership. More speciﬁcally,
his study examines knowledge incentive mechanisms and through
pplication of theories of psychological ownership, to ﬁnd out
hich factors have a bearing on management processes that aim at
ncouraging individual innovative behavior. This research makes
wo speciﬁc contributions to the theory of knowledge incen-
ive mechanisms: (1) approaching the topic from an ownership
erspective, this study proposes a new categorization of knowl-
dge incentive mechanisms that is conducive to gaining more
etailed insights into patterns of individual knowledge behav-
or; (2) employing ownership theory, this study merges aspects
f organizational systems (knowledge incentive mechanisms) and
ndividual psychological states (e.g. psychological ownership of
nowledge) for an integrated view that allows a more exhaustive
nd precise description of the management processes that govern
ndividual innovative behavior within organizations.
.1.2. Methods of encouraging creation of new knowledge
Through the analysis of the relevant literature, this research dis-
overed that individual creation behavior follows certain patterns
hat are most accurately expressed in the theories of knowl-
dge incentive mechanisms and the creation of new knowledge.
nowledge incentive mechanisms emphasize personal gain and
ndividual ownership: by creating new knowledge, employees may
btain physical ownership (e.g. in the form of shares), and as a
esult they will view any new knowledge they create as an exten-
ion of their own person (Furby, 1978), which in turn generates a
rotective or defensive attitude (Hall, 1996). This sense of psycho-
ogical ownership of knowledge provides leverage for inﬂuencing
ndividual creation behavior.
.1.3. Applying the theory of psychological ownership to the
peciﬁc sense of psychological ownership of knowledge
Making use of the psychometric theory of psychological own-
rship, this research employed questionnaires based on rigorous
sychometric scales and procedures. This study formulated ques-
ions and parameters for assessing the potential targets of
sychological ownership. Our goal was to expand the scope of
ssessment from the original organizational patterns to knowledge
tself. This helped us to ensure the general applicability of our ques-
ionnaire results, as well as allowing for a proper representation of
he issue’s complexity. In this study echo the views of Van Dyne
nd Pierce (2004),  who stated that the idea of psychological own-
rship may  well be applied to the assessment of problems outside
f organizational theory (e.g. equipment, technology, products and
ervice procedures that form part of the working environment).
herefore, this study has also made a contribution to strengthen-
ng the positivistic basis of general constructs for measuring the
ense of psychological ownership.
.2. Practical implications
.2.1. Increasing R&D professionals’ perceived psychological
wnership
With this study focus on the psychological processes that
nderlie knowledge creation, our integrated model allows us to
ink individuals’ psychological ownership to their engagement in
nowledge creation. The important role of individuals’ psycholog-
cal ownership on knowledge creation has also been highlighted
n this study. The fact that the new knowledge R&D engineers
ften acquire is complex makes it more difﬁcult to share. Thus,
&D professionals’ perceived psychological ownership in knowl-
dge creation is central to its occurrence, because actions are based
ore on what people believe they can do than on what theyion Management 32 (2012) 442– 450 449
actually can do. Therefore, managers should strive to increase R&D
professionals’ perceived psychological ownership by establishing
mechanisms through which employees receive feedback whenever
knowledge creation takes place.
6.2.2. Formal knowledge incentive mechanisms being beneﬁcial
for the promotion of knowledge creation behavior among R&D
professionals
This study suggests that formal knowledge incentive mech-
anisms are beneﬁcial for the promotion of knowledge creation
behavior among R&D professionals. Though other researchers have
suggested that ﬁrms need to create speciﬁc interventions for
knowledge creation purposes, this study provides evidence that
the regular organizational mechanisms are also important for shap-
ing individuals’ knowledge creation. The evidence from this study
supports the idea that some knowledge incentive mechanisms
may  enhance employees’ perceived psychological ownership to
create knowledge. Knowledge management is, in fact, multidisci-
plinary. A ﬁrm needs to integrate its formal practices with speciﬁc
knowledge-management initiatives to allow the creation of new
knowledge. If ﬁrms lack sufﬁcient formal practices and structural
mechanisms, they may  encounter a situation in which knowledge
management initiatives do not add value.
7. Limitations
This research was subject to the following limitations. First,
the sample used in this study consisted of large enterprises (with
annual operating revenues in excess of US $3 billion). Future
research may  consider using data from SMEs. Second, the subjective
assessment of knowledge creation behavior may not objectively
express real knowledge creative performance. Future research
should simultaneously employ subjective and objective assess-
ment standards. This research may, for example, simultaneously
evaluate self-assessment scores and R&D patent results.
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